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Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl: The Creation
of Second-Class Native American Parents
Under the Indian Child Welfare Act of
1978
Dustin C. Jonest
For us as Indians, much is at stake, because it is about nurturing
community and culture, while honoring our traditions. After all, we are
fond of saying: "The children are our future."'

Introduction
In June 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court found that an
absentee biological Native American father could have his
parental rights terminated without triggering the greater
procedural protections afforded to Native American parents under
the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA).2 In finding that
absentee Native American parents are not entitled to the same
federal protection under the ICWA regarding the involuntary
termination of parental rights, the Court, through judicial fiat,
wrote a whole segment of Native American parents out of the
ICWA's protection. The Court's justification for reading absentee
Native American parental rights out of the statute's protection
was the mere speculation that Congress could not have meant to
give parents who abandoned their children the same amount of
t. B.A. Liberty University, 2007; Th.M Dallas Theological Seminary, 2011;
J.D. University of Minnesota Law School, 2014. I would like to thank Professor
John Borrows for his advice and continuous support throughout the writing of this
Case Comment, Lindsay Carniak McLaughlin and Jennifer Wong for their
invaluable suggestions for improvements, and other staffers and editors at Law
and Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice for their support and work in
bringing this Comment to print. I would also like to thank my family who have
supported me throughout all of my higher education, especially my mother, Melissa
C. Jones, and grandparents, Robert E. and Sara Rachel Jones. Finally, I would like
to dedicate this Comment to Michelle A.S. Barnes for her continued and
unwavering support of me in all my endeavors.
1. Michael D. Petoskey, Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa
Indians Tribal Member and Tribal Judge, Foreword to FACING THE FUTURE: THE
INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT AT 30, at vii (Matthew L. M. Fletcher et al., eds., 2009)
[hereinafter FACING THE FUTURE].

2. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013); Indian Child Welfare
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963
(1983)) [hereinafter the ICWAI.
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protection of parental rights as those parents who maintain a
custodial relationship with their children.'
In an historic moment, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down
its second of only two decisions construing the ICWA since the
statute's enactment. While the media waited with bated breath
for two U.S. Supreme Court decisions relating to gay marriage,'
Native Americans and others in the legal community watched to
see whether the U.S. Supreme Court would find the ICWA
unconstitutional or severely limit its application. 6 Though the
Court's decision in Adoptive Couple did not find the ICWA
unconstitutional for exceeding Congress's authority under the
Indian Commerce Clause or for perpetuating racial discrimination,
the majority opinion did unleash a new form of invidious hostility
toward Native Americans.
The essence of Adoptive Couple's
holding is the creation of two classes of Native American parents.
3. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2561 ("[It would be absurd to think that
Congress enacted a provision that permits termination of a custodial parent's
rights, while simultaneously prohibiting termination of a noncustodial parent's
rights. If the statute draws any distinction between custodial and noncustodial
parents, that distinction surely does not provide greater protection for noncustodial
parents.").
4. See Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989) (holding
that Congress did not intend for state law to define "domiciled" in 25
U.S.C. § 1911(a) and that while the mother gave birth to twin babies off of the
Choctaw Reservation, the twin babies' domicile was the Choctaw Reservation
because both mother and father were domiciled on the reservation).
5. See, e.g., Richard Wolf, Supreme Court Gay MarriageRulings: Anything but
Simple,
USA
TODAY
(June
16,
2013,
8:03
AM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/06/16/supreme-courts-gaymarriage-rulings-to-raise-more-questions/2426553/ (describing the potential legal
implications of pro-gay-marriage decisions in Hollingsworth and Windsor an entire
ten days before the Court announced those decisions).
6. See Marcia Zug, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl: Two-and-a-Half Ways to
Destroy Indian Law, 111 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 46, 49-50, 52 (April

2013), available at http//www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/lll/Zug.pdf
(predicting that the U.S. Supreme Court might find the ICWA unconstitutional
because of the Roberts Court's repugnancy toward statutes with racial preferences
due to said statutes allegedly perpetuating racism, that the ICWA might be found
to exceed Congress' authority under the Indian Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 3, or that the ICWA unconstitutionally invades the residuum of
sovereignty historically reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution in regulating child custody and adoption proceedings).
7. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 19-20, Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552
(No. 12-399) (Kagan, J.) ("[W]hat your argument seems to be suggesting is that
there are really two classes of parents under the statute, right, that everybody is
labeled a parent, but then there are the parents who get the protections of-of the
termination of rights provision and the parents who don't."). See generally, Leading
Cases: Indian Child Act-Termination of ParentalRights-Adoptive Couple v.
Baby Girl, 127 HARV. L. REV. 368, 373 (2013) (describing Adoptive Couple as
another development in the Court's parental rights jurisprudence and "the Court's
trend toward provisional prioritization of family over biology").
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The first class of Native American parents is comprised of those
who remain
in stereotypical,
Anglo-American
marital
relationships, financially support their children, and exercise
parental care over them. This class receives the heightened
protection under the ICWA from involuntary termination of their
parental rights. The other class of Native American parents
("second-class" parents) is comprised of those absent in a child's
life-an amorphous group of parents deemed to have forfeited the
parental rights deserving protection under the ICWA merely
because of their absence.
In Adoptive Couple, the Court failed to differentiate between
Native American parents who abandoned their children and those
Native American parents absent from a child's life for a period of
time, but who might want to be reunited with the child. In 2011,
sixty-six percent of all Native American and Alaska Native births
were outside of the marriage relationship.8 In light of this
statistic, the Court's decision in Adoptive Couple promises to affect
more than those parents who society pejoratively labels "deadbeat
parents." Moreover, the Court in Adoptive Couple removed the
federal barrier Congress created to curtail states from vitiating
tribal identity and heritage through systemic, state-sanctioned
removal of Native American children from Native American
homes. Adoptive Couple eviscerates the congressional intent of the
ICWA, which never distinguishes between the parental rights of
custodial Native American parents and noncustodial Native
American parents in the context of an involuntary termination of
those rights. The decision also re-opens the pathway for hostile
state laws and state judicial decisions to work adversely against
tribal interests in the Native American parent-child-tribe
relationship.9 This Comment's contention is that Native American
children of absentee Native American parents are no less valuable
to the preservation of tribal identity than those children of
custodial Native American parents.
This Comment argues that the U.S. Supreme Court erred in
holding that the ICWA does not apply when a Native American

8. Joyce A. Martin et al., Births: Final Data for 2011, 61 Nat'l Vital Statistics
at
2013),
available
(June
28,
at
12
Reports
1,
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr62/nvsr62_01.pdf.

9. See generally Robert A. Williams, Jr., "The People of the States Where They
Are Found Are Often Their Deadliest Enemies: " The Indian Side of the Story of
Indian Rights and Federalism, 38 ARiz. L. REV. 981, 987 (1996) ("History teaches
Indian peoples that in a federal system of government, the [Wihite racial power
organized through state governments represents the gravest and most persistent
threat to Indian rights and cultural survival on this continent.").
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parent never had legal or physical custody of his or her child. Part
I of this Comment provides the factual background and statutory
framework leading up to Adoptive Couple, including a synopsis of
the South Carolina's state court proceedings and decisions leading
to the Adoptive Couple decision and a brief overview of the ICWA
provisions in controversy. Part II provides a detailed description
of the Adoptive Couple holding and reasoning. Part III analyzes
and critiques the Adoptive Couple holding and reasoning through
the prism of the ICWA's statutory scheme, with a focus on
congressional intent behind enacting the ICWA and the Court's
disregard of the Indian law canons of construction in interpreting
the federal statute. A crucial component of Part III is the
juxtaposition of the Adoptive Couple holding and the rationale
behind the "Existing Indian Family" exception, a state-created
common law exception to the application of the ICWA. This
juxtaposition identifies the similarities between the reasoning in
Adoptive Couple and the "Existing Indian Family" exception and
highlights the latter's recent repudiation among state courts for
not comporting with the ICWA's legislative purpose and scheme.
Part IV examines how the Adoptive Couple holding creates a
legal vacuum in determining whether a Native American
possesses the sine qua non parental status requisite to invoke the
ICWA. Unfortunately, if an absentee Native American biological
parent is deemed not to fit within the ambit of the ICWA, the
individual is not able to object to a child custody or adoption
proceeding under the statute. Naturally, since the U.S. Supreme
Court found that the ICWA could not have contemplated the
federal statute to protect absentee Native American parents, state
family law, which is inherently adverse to absentee parents and is
insensitive to the federal creation of a unique enclave of protection
for Native American parent-child-tribal relationships, will fill that
legal vacuum. Part V addresses proposed solutions for this
problem. Part V suggests that Congress either amend the ICWA
to expressly protect the parental rights of absentee Native
American parents or amend the statute to permit the exclusive use
of tribal law in determining when to involuntarily terminate
Native American parental rights. The bulk of the analysis in Part
V focuses on the nature of tribal laws governing tribal courts in
the judicial process of terminating Native American parental
rights due to abandonment.
This Comment argues that
permitting exclusive use of tribal law is preferred, as it promotes
tribal prerogatives, especially tribal self-determination and
sovereignty. As this Comment will demonstrate, tribal laws
generally provide greater protections and opportunities for
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absentee Native American parents to reunite with their children
before termination of their parental rights, and thus, comport
more fully with the statutory scheme of the ICWA than the rule
enunciated in Adoptive Couple.
I.

South Carolina: The Battle Ground State
A.

The FactualBackground for Adoptive Couple

The child at the center of the Adoptive Couple decision is a
little girl named Veronica. She received the moniker "Baby Girl"
throughout the course of the state and federal court proceedings.'o
The child was "born in Oklahoma on September 15, 2009."" In
December 2008, the father, Dusten Brown, and the biological
mother got engaged.12 The next month, January 2009, the mother
announced to the father that she was pregnant. 2
During
December 2008 and January 2009, the biological father was
serving in active duty for "the United States Army and stationed
at Fort Sill, Oklahoma" close to "his hometown of Bartlesville,
Oklahoma, where his parents" and Veronica's mother lived."
After the father discovered the mother was pregnant with
Veronica, he urged the mother to move the wedding up sooner
than originally planned." Throughout the first several months of
2009, the father continued to speak with the mother daily, but the
relationship deteriorated around April 2009.16 During the family
court proceedings, the mother testified that she officially broke off
the engagement with Veronica's father via text message in May
2009." The mother's reason for the dissolution of the engagement
was because Veronica's father kept "pressuring her to get
married."" The father claimed in family court that he continued
to make "post-breakup attempts to call and text message [the]
[miother," but the family court record indicated that the father did
not make much of an effort to keep in contact with Veronica's
mother after the dissolution of the engagement.'
Consequently,
Veronica's parents never lived together and Veronica's father
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 552 (S.C. 2012).
Id.
Id. at 552-53.
Id.
Id.at 553.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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never financially supported Veronica's mother during the
20
pregnancy.
In June 2009, the mother contacted Veronica's father via text
message and asked him if he would financially support Veronica or
be willing to relinquish parental rights over her. 2 ' During the
family court proceedings, the father testified that he relinquished
parental rights only to grant Veronica's mother sole custody, and
did not intend to consent to Veronica's adoption.22 The father
admitted under cross-examination that "his behavior was not
conducive to being a father."2 ' The mother said she placed
Veronica up for adoption because she already had two children
from a prior relationship, and she could not afford a third child.24
Veronica's mother found adoption to be in Veronica's best interest
because it would provide a stable home and the financial support
Veronica needed.25
In June 2009, Veronica's mother turned to the Nightlight
Christian Adoption Agency to help initiate and facilitate the
Through this adoption
adoption proceedings for Veronica.2 '
agency, Veronica's mother selected the Capobianco family in South
Carolina. The Capobiancos are a married couple: a wife with "a
Master's Degree and a Ph.D in developmental psychology" and her
husband, who is "an automotive body technician currently working
for Boeing."27 After several weeks of talking on the phone with the
Capobiancos, the potential "[aldoptive [miother visited [Veronica's]
[m]other in Oklahoma in August 2009."28 After the visitation, the
Capobiancos provided financial support to Veronica's mother
during the latter part of the pregnancy and after Veronica was
born.29
During the adoption proceedings, Veronica's mother knew
there was legal significance attached to the fact that Veronica's
father is a member of the Cherokee Nation." A pre-placement

20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. ("Father explained: '[iln my mind I thought that if I would do that I'd be
able to give her time to think about this and possibly maybe we would get back
together and continue what we had started.'").
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. The Capobiancos "have no other children." Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 554.
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form revealed a measure of intentional concealment of the father's
relationship to the Cherokee Nation.'
As a result, the
Capobiancos hired an attorney for Veronica's mother for the
duration of the adoption proceedings. This attorney sent a letter
to the Child Welfare Division of the Cherokee Nation and
"inquire[d] about [the] [fMather's status as an enrolled Cherokee
Indian."3 2 The Cherokee Nation could not verify that Veronica's
father was an enrolled member of the tribe because the attorney
misspelled the father's name and did not include the correct
birthdate of the father.3 3 The Cherokee Nation informed the
mother's attorney of its inability to verify Veronica's father as a
member of the tribe, but the Cherokee Nation did point out that
"'[a]ny incorrect or omitted family documentation could invalidate
this determination.'"
During the family court proceedings,
Veronica's mother "testified she told her attorney that the letter
was incorrect and that [the] [fMather was an enrolled member, but
that she did not know his correct birthdate."" Nevertheless,
Veronica's mother testified that she relied upon the attorney's
investigation with the Child Welfare Division of the Cherokee
Nation.3 r Therefore, when Veronica was born, her mother believed
that Veronica's father was not a member of the Cherokee Nation.3 '
The morning after Veronica's birth, Veronica's mother signed
the necessary documentation "relinquishing her parental rights
and consenting to the adoption."
In accordance with the
Oklahoma Interstate Compact on Placement of Children," the
adopting parents signed the necessary paperwork and remained in
the state to meet the statutory requirements for removing
Veronica from Oklahoma to South Carolina.4 o In all of the signed
31. Id. ("Initially the birth mother did not wish to identify the father, said she
wanted to keep things low-key as possible for the [Appellants], because he's
registered in the Cherokee tribe. It was determined that naming him [the father]
would be detrimental to the adoption.").
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. ("Appellants were required to receive consent from the State of
Oklahoma pursuant to the Oklahoma Interstate Compact on Placement of Children
(ICPC) as a prerequisite to removing Baby Girl from that state."). See also
Interstate Compact on Placement of Children, OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 577 (2013)
(establishing orderly procedure and setting responsibilities for interstate placement
of children).
40. Id.
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documentation for relinquishing parental rights and removing
Veronica from Oklahoma, Veronica's mother "reported Baby Girl's
ethnicity as 'Hispanic' instead of 'Native American.'"" During the
family court proceedings, a specialist for the Child Welfare
Division of the Cherokee Nation testified that if "the Cherokee
Nation [had] known about Baby Girl's Native American heritage,
Appellants would not have been able to remove Baby Girl from
Oklahoma."a
While the Capobiancos initiated the adoption proceedings in
South Carolina a mere three days after Veronica's birth, they did
not "serve or otherwise notify [the] [fMather of the adoption action
until January 6, 2010, approximately four months after Baby Girl
was born and days before [the] [fMather was scheduled to deploy to
Iraq." 3 On that day, Veronica's father received legal papers,
which he signed under the impression that he was relinquishing
his parental rights to his daughter's biological mother." However,
after he realized that the paperwork terminated his parental
rights and provided consent for adoption, Veronica's father
consulted with an attorney and "requested a stay of the adoption
proceedings under the Servicemember's Civil Relief Act
("SCRA")."4 ' A few days later, Veronica's father "filed a summons
and complaint in an Oklahoma district court to establish
paternity, child custody, and support of Baby Girl."4 On January
18, 2010, the U.S. military deployed Veronica's biological father to
Iraq and he did not return to the United States until December 26,
2010.41
On March 16, 2010, the Capobiancos and the biological
mother filed a motion to dismiss the father's summons and
complaint. 5 The Oklahoma district court granted the motion to
dismiss. 5 Nevertheless, in January 2010, the Cherokee Nation
discovered that Veronica's father was "a registered member [of the
tribe] and determined that Baby Girl was an 'Indian Child,' as
defined under the [ICWA]." As a result, the Capobiancos and the
41. Id.
42. Id. at 554-55.
43. Id. at 555 (noting that the Capobiancos notified the biological father of the
adoption a mere twelve days before his deployment to Iraq).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.

49. Id.
50. Id.

2014]1

ADOPTIVE COUPLE V. BABY GIRL

429

mother "amended their South Carolina pleadings to acknowledge
[the] [flather's membership in the Cherokee Nation.""
Consequently, "on April 7, 2010, the Cherokee Nation filed a
Notice of Intervention in the South Carolina action." On May 6,
2010, the South Carolina family court mandated paternity testing
that identified Veronica's father to be Dusten Brown. The family
court also established its jurisdiction over the case and lifted the
stay under the SCRA.'
On May 25, 2010, Veronica's father
"answered Appellants' amended complaint, stating he did not
consent to the adoption of Baby Girl and [was] seeking custody.""
As a result, the family court "set a hearing date for the case, and
found separately that the ICWA applied to the case."56
B. The South CarolinaFamily Court's Judgment

On September 12 through September 15, 2011, the South
Carolina family court held a trial to determine whether it needed
to terminate the adoption proceeding and enter an order returning
Veronica back to her father, or whether Veronica's adoption could
proceed." On November 25, 2011, the family court rendered a
final judgment in the Adoptive Couple case, and gave four reasons
for terminating the proceedings." First, the court found that "the
ICWA applied and it was not unconstitutional."55 Second, the
court determined that the "Existing Indian Family" exception did
not apply "as an exception to the application of the ICWA in this
case" because of "the clear modern trend" away from that
doctrine.60 Third, the court found that the father "did not
voluntarily consent to the termination of his parental rights or the
adoption." 6 1 Finally, the court concluded that the Capobiancos
"failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence" that the father's
"parental rights should be terminated" or that granting custody to

51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 555-56.
54. Id. at 556.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. (finding that the ICWA applied to Veronica and that the ICWA was not
facially or as-applied unconstitutional).
60. Id.; see discussion infra Part II(C) and note 131.
61. Id.
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her father "would likely result in serious emotional or physical
harm" to Veronica.62
On December 28, 2011, the family court entered a final
decree that denied the Capobiancos' adoption petition and
After the adoptive
required Veronica's return to her father.'
couple failed to get the father's family to reconsider the matter,
The court of appeals
they appealed the family court decision.
initially granted a writ of supersedeas, but lifted it on December
30, 2011.65 Consequently, "[o]n December 31, 2011, Appellants
transferred Baby Girl to [her biological] [fiather, and [the] [flather
and his parents immediately traveled with Baby Girl back to
Oklahoma.""
C. The South Carolina Supreme Court Judgment

On April 17, 2012, the Supreme Court of South Carolina
heard oral arguments for the Adoptive Couple case.6 ' The court
rendered its decision and final judgment on August 22, 2012.
The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the congressional
findings and the legislative intent which culminated in the
enactment of the ICWA."9 The court found that it had to review
the appeal of the family court's decision through the "lens" of the
ICWA "[blecause the ICWA establishes 'minimum Federal
standards for the removal of Indian children from their families'
and applies to any child custody proceeding involving an Indian
child." 0 The court agreed with the family court that Veronica's
father satisfied the statutory definition of "parent" in the ICWA,71
because he "both acknowledg [ed] his paternity through the pursuit
of court proceedings as soon as he realized Baby Girl had been

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 550.
68. Id.
69. Id. 557-58.
70. Id. at 558 (emphasis added). At this juncture, the Supreme Court of South
Carolina did not find any statutory justification for excluding an absentee Native
American father from the heightened protections afforded to Native American
parental rights in termination proceedings under the ICWA.
71. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9) (1978) (defining "parent" as "any biological parent or
parents of an Indian child or any Indian person who has lawfully adopted an
Indian child, including adoptions under tribal law or custom. It does not include the
unwed father where paternity has not been acknowledged or established.").
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placed up for adoption and establish[ed] his paternity through

DNA testing."72
The court found that even though the "ICWA incorporates
state law termination grounds, it also clearly mandates state
courts consider heightened federal requirements to terminate
parental rights as to ICWA parents.""
The court's decision
provided an important observation supported from the statutory
scheme of the ICWA that was later ignored by the U.S. Supreme
Court with mere statutory speculation:
While state termination grounds play a part in custody
proceedings under the ICWA, we believe, unlike the dissent,
that state law cannot operate to frustrate the clear purposes of
the ICWA, as 'Congress perceived the States and their courts
as partly responsible for the problem [the ICWA] intended to
correct'. . . . [State] abandonment law cannot be used to
frustrate the federal legislative judgment expressed in the
ICWA that the interests of the tribe in custodial decisions
made with respect to Indian children are as entitled to respect
as the interests of the parents.7 4
The Supreme Court of South Carolina found that Veronica's
father did not voluntarily terminate his parental rights because he
signed the "Acceptance of Service" document without knowledge
that it relinquished his parental rights, and that even if he did
consent, his "subsequent legal campaign to obtain custody of Baby
Girl has rendered any such consent withdrawn.""
The court
concluded that since the father did not voluntarily terminate his
parental rights, the adoptive couple needed to demonstrate by
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that his parental rights over
the Native American child should be terminated.
After
conducting an involuntary termination analysis of the father's
parental rights, the court rejected the adoptive couple's argument
that active remedial measures to reunite the father with Veronica
were futile. The court came to this conclusion because, despite the
father's initial lack of interest in parenting Veronica at her birth,
upon learning of the adoption he immediately attempted to

72. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 560.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 561 n.21 (internal citations omitted).
75. Id. at 561; see 25 U.S.C. § 1913(c) (1978) ("[T]he consent of the parent may
be withdrawn for any reason at any time prior to the entry of a final decree of
termination or adoption, as the case may be, and the child shall be returned to the
parent.").
76. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (1978) ("No termination of parental rights may be
ordered in such proceeding in the absence of a determination ... that the continued
custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious
emotional or physical damage to the child."); Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 561.
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establish a physical and legal presence in his daughter's life. He
also continued to assert his desire to parent Veronica throughout
the adoption proceedings and legal battles in state court.77
The court also rejected the adoptive couple's argument that
Veronica would suffer serious emotional or physical damage if
returned to her father.7 8 During the family court proceedings, the
court considered expert testimony given by a specialist for the
Child Welfare Division of the Cherokee Nation.7 9 The expert
witness put forth evidence that revealed Veronica's father's "home
was clean, safe, and appropriate and that there were many acres
of land surrounding the home for outdoor play.""0 The specialist
further attested to the fact that Veronica's father was "a good
father who enjoyed a close relationship with his other daughter"
and that children Veronica's age "tended to thrive when reunited
with their Indian parents."" Moreover, the court found that the
ICWA's "best interests of the child" analysis did not stop with the
child because "[uin making this determination, the child's
relationship with his or her tribe is an important consideration."8 2
Ultimately, the court found that by "transferring custody to [the]
[fMather and his family, Baby Girl's familial and tribal ties may be
established and maintained in furtherance of the clear purpose of
the ICWA, which is to preserve American Indian culture by
retaining its children within the tribe."" Finally, the South
Carolina Supreme Court determined that even if it terminated the
father's parental rights, the ICWA recommends a hierarchical
preference given to "(1) a member of the child's extended family;
(2) other members of the Indian child's tribe; or (3) other Indian
families."" The court concluded that the federal standard of the
ICWA precluded termination of the father's parental rights.85

77. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 562.

78. Id. at 563.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 564.

82. Id. at 565 ("T]he ICWA is 'based on the fundamental assumption that it is
in the Indian child's best interest that its relationship to the tribe be protected.'"
(internal citations omitted)).
83. Id. at 566.
84. Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a)).
85. Id. at 567 ("Adoptive Couple are ideal parents who have exhibited the
ability to provide a loving family environment for Baby Girl.... [We simply see
this case as one in which the dictates of federal Indian law supersede state law
where the adoption and custody of an Indian child is at issue.").
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II. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl
In the 2013 case Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, the U.S.
Supreme Court found that the ICWA §1912(f)," which prohibits an
involuntary termination of Native American parental rights over a
Native American child except where there has been a heightened
showing that serious harm to the Native American child is likely
to result from the parent's "continued custody" of the child, does
not apply where the Native American parent never had physical or
legal custody of the child.87 The Court also held that the ICWA
§1912(d)," which requires a showing that remedial efforts were
made to prevent the "breakup of the Indian family" before
involuntarily terminating Native American parental rights, does
not apply where the Native American parent never had an active
relationship with the child that would be disrupted by the
termination of parental rights.8 ' Finally, the Court found that the
ICWA §1915(a),9 ' which provides placement preferences for the
adoption of Native American children to extended family in the
child's tribe, other members of the child's tribe, and other Native
American families, does not apply where the parent failed to
formally seek adoption, even though that parent operated under
the belief that he or she retained interminable parental rights, and
no other family or tribal member or Native American formally
attempted to adopt the child.9'
The majority decision in Adoptive Couple is predicated upon a
construction of the ICWA in the most literal terms. The Court
held that the ICWA's protection of Native American parental
rights is not implicated for noncustodial Native American
86. 25 U.S.C. §1912(f) (1978).
87. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2561 (2013) ("In sum, when, as here, the
adoption of an Indian child is voluntarily and lawfully initiated by a non-Indian
parent with sole custodial rights, the ICWA's primary goal of preventing the
unwarranted removal of Indian children and the dissolution of Indian families is
not implicated.").
88. 25 U.S.C. §1912(d) (1978).
89. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2562 ("Consistent with the statutory text, we
hold that §1912(d) applies only in cases where an Indian family's 'breakup' would
be precipitated by the termination of the parent's rights.... But when an Indian
parent abandons an Indian child prior to birth and that child has never been in the
Indian parent's legal or physical custody, there is no 'relationship'. . . . In such a
situation, the 'breakup of the Indian family' has long since occurred, and §1912(d)
is inapplicable.").
90. 25 U.S.C. §1915(a) (1978).
91. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2564 ("§1915(a)'s preferences are inapplicable
in cases where no alternative party has formally sought to adopt the child. This is
because there simply is no 'preference' to apply if no alternative party that is
eligible to be preferred under §1915(a) has come forward.").
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parents.12 The Court came to this interpretation of the ICWA by
defining "continued custody" from Webster's Third New
International Dictionary as meaning "stretching out in time or

space esp. without interruption" and also "resumed after
interruption. "
The Court also held that the ICWA's greater
protections of Native American parental rights apply only where
there is a literal breakup of the Native American family.94 The
Court looked to the American Heritage Dictionary to define
"breakup" as "[tihe discontinuance of a relationship."" Finally, the
Court held that the preferential hierarchy for Native American
adoptions found in the ICWA is inapplicable when, as in Adoptive
Couple, the child's extended tribal family, the tribe itself, or
another preferential party does not formally initiate adoption
proceedings. 6
The Court announces in the majority opinion that its main
concern is a situation where "a biological Indian father could
abandon his child in utero and refuse any support for the birth
mother ... then could play his ICWA trump card at the eleventh
hour to override the mother's decision and the child's best
interests.9
Nevertheless, on remand from the U.S. Supreme
Court, the South Carolina Supreme Court exchanged any
thorough and meaningful analysis of Veronica's best interests for a
conclusory analysis that made assumptions that inherently
contradict the purpose of the ICWA. On remand, the South
Carolina Supreme Court stated: "Birth Father is precluded from
challenging the adoption. Moreover, in light of the urgent need for
this matter to be concluded, we determine, upon review of the
record, that the adoption of Baby Girl by the Adoptive Couple is in
the best interests of Baby Girl."" Since the U.S. Supreme Court

92. Id. at 2560 ("As a result, § 1912(f) does not apply in cases where the Indian
parent never had custody of the Indian child.").
93. Id.
94. Id. at 2562 ("Consistent with the statutory text, we hold that § 1912(d)
applies only in cases where an Indian family's 'breakup' would be precipitated by
the termination of the parent's rights.").
95. Id.
96. Id.at 2564 ("In this case, Adoptive Couple was the only party that sought to
adopt Baby Girl in the Family Court or the South Carolina Supreme Court.").
97. Id. at 2565.
98. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 746 S.E.2d 346, 347 (S.C. 2013). Some
commentators predicted this holding, assuming that on remand the South Carolina
family court would take into consideration that Veronica had been in the care of
her biological father for two years during the legal proceedings before terminating
Brown's parental rights. See, e.g., Marcia Zug, The Court Got Baby Veronica
Wrong,
SLATE
(June
26,
2013,
9:50
AM),
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concocted a statutory interpretation of the ICWA that makes the
heightened protections against termination of parental rights of
the ICWA inapplicable to absentee Native American parents, the
Supreme Court of South Carolina was free not to consider the
goals of the ICWA when determining what is in the best interests
of Veronica (e.g., preserving Native American culture and life,
tribal sovereignty, and input over the adoption of Native American
children). Instead, the South Carolina Supreme Court merely
desired to end litigation over the matter and assumed that
Veronica's best interests were met by returning her to her
adoptive parents."
III. The Statutory Framework of the ICWA* The Confluence
of Legislative History, the Canons of Indian Law
Construction, and the Rejection of a State-Created
Common Law Exception to the ICWA
A.

Adoptive Couple's Creation of Two Classes of Native
American Parents Fails to Comport with the Legislative
History of the ICWA

Before Congress passed the ICWA into law, the congressional
record reflected a disturbing trend among Native American
children. The "[clongressional hearings preceding the adoption of
ICWA documented an alarmingly high percentage of Indian
children removed from their families through state court
proceedings.""oo The House Report framed the detrimental effect
http://www.slate.com/articles/double-x/doublex/2013/06/baby-veronica-indian-adop
tion case-the supremecourt-got~it-wrong.html.
99. At the time this case was remanded back to the South Carolina Supreme
Court from the U.S. Supreme Court, Veronica had been reunited with her Native
American father for almost one and one-half years. How was it in Veronica's best
interest to have her relationship with her father severed after being in his care for
that length of time? See Adoptive Couple,133 S. Ct. at 2586 (2013) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) ("However difficult it must have been for her to leave Adoptive Couple's
home when she was just over 2 years old, it will be equally devastating now if, at
the age of 3 V2, she is again removed from her home and sent to live halfway across
the county.").
100. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 831 (Nell Jessup Newton ed.,
2012) [hereinafter COHEN'S HANDBOOK].
The House Report found that in
Minnesota, Native American children were per capita 5 times more likely than nonNative American children to be placed in foster care or in an adoptive home, at
least 13 times more likely to be placed in foster care in Montana, nearly 16 times
more likely to be placed in foster care in South Dakota, 19 times more likely to be
placed in an adoptive home and 10 times more likely to be placed in foster care in
Washington, and that there was nearly a 1600% greater chance that a Native
American child would be separated from its biological parents in Wisconsin. H.R.
REP. No. 95-1386, at 9 (1978).
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flowing from the disparate and unusually high termination of
Native American parental rights, adoption placements, and foster
care placements in that "[t]he wholesale separation of Indian
children from their families is perhaps the most tragic and
Congress
destructive aspect of American Indian life today."'o
found that state agencies, due to ignorance of "Indian cultural
values and social norms," often misinterpreted leaving children
"outside the nuclear family" with Native American extended
families as "socially irresponsible," "neglect," and "grounds for
terminating parental rights." 0 2
As a result of years of investigation, which included a
compiled record with a common theme that state courts were
"abusing their authority,"103 Congress found that "25% to 35% of all
Indian children had been removed from their families and placed
in foster, adoptive, or institutionalized care."1" A central concern
for tribes expressed before Congress focused on how the high
removal rate for Native American children from tribal homes
eviscerated tribal culture, tribal self-determination, and tribal
sovereignty:
Culturally, the chances of Indian survival are significantly
reduced if our children, the only real means for the
transmission of the tribal heritage, are to be raised in nonIndian homes and denied exposure to the ways of their People.

Furthermore, these practices seriously undercut the tribes'
ability to continue as self-governing communities. Probably in
no area is it more important that tribal sovereignty be
respected than in an area as socially and culturally
determinative as family relationships.0'
Congress expressed two overarching concerns with the high

removal rate of Native American children: "the importance of
sensitivity to tribal culture in rendering Indian child welfare

101. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 9.
102. Id. at 10.
103. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 100.
104. Id. See also H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 9 ("Surveys of States with large
Indian populations conducted by the Association on American Indian Affairs
(AAIA) in 1969 and again in 1974 indicate that approximately 25-35% of all Indian
children are separated from their families and placed in foster homes, adoptive
homes, or institutions. In some States the problem is getting worse: in Minnesota,
one in every eight Indian children under 18 years of age is living in an adoptive
home; and, in 1971-72, nearly one in every four Indian children under 1 year of age
was adopted.").
105. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1977: Hearing on S. 1214 Before the S. Select
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong. 154, 157 (1977) (statement of Calvin Isaac,
Tribal Chief of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians).
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decisions and respect for tribal sovereignty."106 Throughout the
congressional debates, the Senate and House emphasized the need
to restore tribal sovereignty over Native American child welfare. 07
The focus on tribal sovereignty arises from the recognition that the
welfare of Native American children is intertwined with tribal selfidentity and self-preservation."
Thus, Congress' concern for
tribal sovereignty over matters of Native American child welfare
and the acknowledgement that tribes possess a similar amount of
interest in Native American children as their biological parents
culminated with the ICWA's opening declaration enshrining the
factual findings from the congressional investigations preceding
the passage of the statute.'09 Even the U.S. Supreme Court has
106. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 100, at 832; see also S. REP. NO. 95-597, at
12 (1977) ("Two basic concepts surfaced at the hearings.... [Tihe need for ... a
deeper cultural sensitivity toward the Indian people ... [and] that Indian tribes
were recognized as [sic] by the United States as sovereign governmental units and
as such the final decision making powers in areas as basic as child welfare should
rest within the relm [sic] of tribal jurisdiction.").
107. 124 CONG. REC. 38,102 (1978) (statement of Rep. and Chairman Morris
Udall) ("Indian tribes and Indian people are being drained of their children and, as
a result, their future as a tribe and a people is being placed in jeopardy."); 124
CONG. REC. 38,103 (1978) (statement of Minority sponsor Rep. Robert
Lagomarsino) ("For Indians generally and tribes in particular, the continued
wholesale removal of their children by nontribal government and private agencies
constitutes a serious threat to their existence as on-going, self-governing
communities."). Representative Lagomarsino added that the federal government's
responsibility "as trustee for Indian tribal lands and resources" is "to act to assist
tribes in protecting their most precious resource, their children. . . . [This
legislation] is ... designed to prevent the unnecessary and unjustifiable separation
of Indian children from their families and tribal communities by providing for
effective due process and equal protection under the law." 124 CONG. REC. 38,103
(1978).
108. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 37 (1989)
("The ICWA . . . 'seeks to protect the rights of the Indian child as an Indian and the
rights of the Indian community and tribe in retaining its children in its society.'");
Chester Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Serv. v. Coleman, 372 S.E.2d 912, 914 (S.C. App. 1988)
("The Act is based on the assumption that protection of the Indian child's
relationship to the tribe is in the child's best interest."); Yavapai-Apache Tribe v.
Mejia, 906 S.W.2d 152, 169 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) ("Under the ICWA, what is best for
an Indian child is to maintain ties with the Indian Tribe, culture, and family."
(internal citations omitted)); see H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 17 (1978) (expressing a
federal government obligation under the plenary power of Congress over Native
American affairs to ensure minor Native American children receive an opportunity
to access the benefits of his or her tribal identity). See generally COHEN'S
HANDBOOK, supra note 100, at 833-34 (describing tribal cultural experiences like
hunting, fishing, and land rights distinct to any one particular tribe as the nexus
between Native American children's best interest and tribes' interest in retaining
Native American children within their tribal communities).
109. Congress articulated the concerns of a weakened tribal self-determination
over Native American children welfare, the high rate of removal of Native
American children, and state judicial and agency biases against tribes in the
ICWA's congressional findings. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3-(5) (1978) ("[Tlhat there is no
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recognized that tribal interest in a child of the tribe, though
distinctly different from the parents, is no less important."x0
Beyond tribal interests in curtailing the massive removal of
Native American children from tribal communities and the
resulting destruction of tribal existence, the ICWA addressed the
need for greater protection of Native American parental and
custodial rights."' The statute permits a Native American parent
who voluntarily terminates his or her parental rights or consents
to an adoption to be able to withdraw that termination of parental
rights or rescind the consent at any time up to a court's final
decree of termination or adoption.112 In pursuit of advancing its
goals of uniformity as described in the legislative history, Congress
did not make state law the standard in the ICWA for termination
of parental rights or child placement proceedings."'

resource that is more vital to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes
than their children ... that an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are
broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children ... and that the
States, exercising their recognized jurisdiction over Indian child custody
proceedings through administrative and judicial bodies, have often failed to
recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and social
standards prevailing in Indian communities and families.").
110. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 49 ("The numerous prerogatives accorded the tribes
through the ICWA's substantive provisions . .. must, accordingly, be seen as a
means of protecting not only the interests of individual Indian children and
families, but also of the tribes themselves."). Tribal interests in member Native
American children are a central protection of the ICWA, so much so that only in
narrow situations does the ICWA give priority to parental preferences over tribal
interests. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1978) (allowing a parent to object to the transfer of a
foster care placement or termination of parental rights proceeding for a nonreservation Native American child to tribal court from state court). But see 25
U.S.C. § 1911(a) (1978) (granting tribal courts exclusive jurisdiction over any child
custody proceeding where the Native American child resides or is domiciled within
the tribe's reservation unless federal law grants state jurisdiction).
111. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e)-(f) (1978) (requiring heightened evidentiary
standards to be met in involuntary proceedings before foster care placement or
termination of parental rights are ordered); 25 U.S.C. § 1913 (1978) (providing the
framework for various safeguards against abuse of voluntary termination of
parental rights and consent to adoptive or foster care placements).
112. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(c) (1978); see also 25 U.S.C. § 1913(d) (1978) (allowing a
parent to withdraw consent to an adoption within two years of a final court decree
if the adoption occurred under fraud or duress).
113. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 100, at 835; see 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1978)
(describing that the federal government's protection of Native American children
and promotion of tribal security will be accomplished by establishing a minimum
federal standard for the removal of Native American children); 25 U.S.C. § 1921
(1978) (permitting the application of state law only where it provides greater
protections than the ICWA); see also Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552,
2574 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)(describing Holyfield's recognition "that
Congress intended the critical terms of the statute to have uniform federal
definitions").
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In Adoptive Couple, the majority opinion placed most of its
legal analysis on a selective reading of the legislative history of the
ICWA. The Court's analysis is representative of a results-oriented
legal analysis with the purpose of depreciating the parental rights
of an absentee Native American parent.1 14 After turning to the
Oxford English Dictionary, Webster's Dictionary, and American
Heritage Dictionary to reach the conclusion that the
ICWA § 1912(f)'s use of "continued" custody presumed a
"preexisting" parental relationship at some point in the past,"' the
Court argued that this dictionary-driven interpretation comports
with the statute's legislative history in curtailing "the
unwarranted removal of Indian children from intact Indian
families."H6 The Court never explains what it meant by "intact"
Native American families, but the Court's selective incorporation
and construction of the ICWA's legislative history reveals a value
judgment about absentee Native American parents not found
operating in the background history of the ICWA. 17
Additionally, the legislative history of the ICWA does not
define parental rights in terms of legal custody or physical custody
of the Native American child. The House Report defines "parent"
to mean "any biological parent or parents of an Indian child or any
114. See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct.at 2572 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court's
opinion ... needlessly demeans the rights of parenthood. It has been the constant
practice of the common law to respect the entitlement of those who bring a child
into the world to raise that child."); Id. at 2573 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
("[N]otwithstanding the majority's focus on the perceived parental shortcomings of
Birth Father, its reasoning necessarily extends to all Indian parents who have
never had custody of their children, no matter how fully those parents have
embraced the financial and emotional responsibilities of parenting.").
115. Id. at 2560.
116. Id. at 2561 (emphasis added).
117. The ICWA's definitional section connects the "termination of parental
rights" with "any action resulting in the termination of the parent-child
relationship." 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(ii). Thus, "the necessary conclusion is that the
word 'custody' does not strictly denote a
state-recognized custodial
relationship.... In keeping with § 1903(1) and the structure and language of §
1912 overall, the phrase 'continued custody' is most sensibly read to refer generally
to the continuation of the parent-child relationship that an ICWA 'parent' has with
his or her child." Adoptive Couple, 133 S Ct. at 2577-78 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
In Brown's situation, a lack of a state-recognized custodial relationship does not
remove him from the procedural safeguards of the ICWA or divest him of the
substantive rights of his parental status. The ICWA protects a Native American
child's relationship with his or her Native American parent regardless of physical
presence or legal custody.
The overarching emphasis of the statute is the
preservation of the biological tribe-parent-child relationship and not the mere
preservation of parental rights contingent upon state-recognized custodial
relationships. Otherwise, the multitude of divergent state law standards defining a
parent-child custodial relationship would defeat the ICWA's goal of providing
minimum federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their families.
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Indian person who has lawfully adopted an Indian child, including
adoptions under tribal law or custom.""" The Adoptive Couple
majority claims that it did not need to address whether Dusten
Brown is a "parent" under the ICWA. But the Court's holding in
essence is a finding that Brown is not a parent because while he
does fit the technical definition of "parent" under the statute, he
cannot enjoy the benefits of his parental status protected by the
ICWA."' In contradiction to the majority's rationale, the House
Report for the ICWA indicates that the only person who is
technically a "parent," but is not entitled to the heightened
parental protections of the ICWA, are unwed fathers who do not
claim or establish paternity."' In Adoptive Couple, Veronica's
father underwent paternity testing and conclusively established
his paternity during the family court proceedings. 121 Furthermore,
the congressional records and the ICWA define the termination of
parental rights as the termination of the parent-child
relationship.122
B. Adoptive Couple's Creation of Two Classes of Native
American ParentsFails to Comport with the Canons of
Indian Law Construction

The canons of Indian law construction are court-created rules
of construction to initially deal with the "unequal bargaining
position" of Native American tribes in making treaties with the
U.S. federal government and the federal government's habit of
reneging on and abrogating terms of treaties."' As a result,
federal courts have generated three rules that provide a generous
and liberal reading of Native American rights in treaties.124 The
three rules of construction are as follows: "ambiguous expressions
118. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 2 (1978); see 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9).
119. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2575 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("But the
majority gives with one hand and takes away with the other. Having assumed a
uniform federal definition of 'parent' that confers certain procedural rights, the
majority then illogically concludes that ICWA's substantive protections are
available only to a subset of 'parent[s]': those who have previously had physical or
state-recognized legal custody of his or her child."). Moreover, "[tihe majority
chooses instead to focus on phrases not statutorily defined that it then uses to
exclude Birth Father from the benefits of his parental status." Id. at 2578.
120. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 2; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9) (codifying in the
ICWA the legislative history's recommended definition).
121. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 555 (S.C. 2012).
122. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 2.
123. Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty

Abrogation: "As Long as Water Flows or Grass Grows Upon the Earth"-How Long
a Time is That? 63 CALIF. L. REV. 601, 617 (1975).
124. Id.
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must be resolved in favor of the Indian parties concerned; Indian
treaties must be interpreted as the Indians themselves would have
understood them; and Indian treaties must be liberally construed
in favor of the Indians."'12 While initially utilized in federal
government-tribal treaty relations, these canons of construction
have also been extended to "non-treaty sources of positive law"

similarly to statutes.

126

While these canons of Indian law construction are only
triggered when a statute is ambiguous,2 " the Adoptive Couple
Court admits that the ICWA is ambiguous on how to deal with
absentee Native American fathers. 12 8 Due to this silence and the
fact that the ICWA never expressly takes away parental rights
from a Native American parent as an ante hoc assumption without
procedural due process,'12 the majority's rationale fails to adhere to
a liberal and favorable reading of the ICWA, violating Indian law
precedent. As observed from the legislative history and statutory
scheme of the ICWA, the ICWA's congressional purpose is
concerned with more than keeping the Anglo-American traditional
version of the family intact (i.e., mother, father, and children), but
focused equally, if not primarily, on tribal self-determination and
preservation of Native American tribes. The majority's cherrypicking of some language (e.g., "removal of Indian children from
their families") from the ICWA's legislative history and text is an
125. Id.
126. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 100, at 114-15 (explaining that the canons
of construction have been used to interpret "agreements, statutes, executive orders,
and federal regulations"); see, e.g., Cnty. of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands
of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 269 (1992) (quoting Mont. v. Blackfeet
Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985)) ("When we are faced with these two possible
constructions [of a statute], our choice between them must be dictated by a
principal deeply rooted in this Court's Indian jurisprudence: 'statutes are to be
construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted
to their benefit.'"); Rincon Band of Luiseno Indians v. Schwarzenegger, 602 F.3d
1019, 1032 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding a judicial obligation to construe the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act "most favorably towards tribal interests"); Citizens
Exposing the Truth About Casinos v. Kempthorne, 492 F.3d 460, 471 (D.C. Cir.
2007) ("[Als [the Indian Game Regulatory Act] is designed to promote the economic
viability of Indian Tribes, the Indian canon of statutory construction requires the
court to resolve any doubt in favor of the Band.").
127. Cnty. Of Yakima, 502 U.S. at 269 (quoting Mont. v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471
U.S. 759, 766 (1985)).
128. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2571 (2013) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) ("[T]he statute does not directly explain how to treat an absentee
Indian father who had next-to-no involvement with his child in the first few months
of her life.").
129. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905) (arguing for the
robust presumption that Native American rights not exclusively ceded in a legal
instrument (e.g., treaty) is not deemed to be forfeited, but remains retained rights).
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attempt to support its interpretation of the ICWA as primarily
addressing the destruction of Native American families. 30 This
cherry-picking is a near-sighted interpretation that glosses over
the pervasive emphasis in the ICWA and its legislative history of
tribal sovereignty over Native American children welfare.
C. The "ExistingIndian Family"Exception and Adoptive
Couple's "ContinuedCustody" Exception: Doctrines with
a Common Ancestor of Thought

The "Existing Indian Family" exception is a common law
exception created by state courts to avoid the application of the
ICWA to adoption or foster care proceedings for Native American
children. It applies when a state court finds that a Native
American child has never been a part of any Native American
family.'"'

In the Matter of Adoption of Baby Boy L., the Kansas

Supreme Court found that the ICWA did not apply to the child of
an unwed non-Native American woman and a man belonging to
the Kiowa Tribe. 13 2 The Kansas Supreme Court argued that the
Native American child could not be removed from a Native
American family or the Kiowa Tribe because the child's father was
incarcerated, the child was born in Wichita, Kansas, off the
reservation, and the non-Native American mother signed adoption
consent forms expressly naming the adoptive couple in the forms
on the day the child was born.133 Nevertheless, twenty states have
130. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2583-84 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("We
may not, however, give effect only to congressional goals we designate 'primary'
while casting aside others classed as 'secondary;' we must apply the entire statute
Congress has written.... Congress also recognized that 'there is no resource that
is more vital to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their
children,' [25 U.S.C.] § 1901(3). As we observed in Holyfield, ICWA protects not
only Indian parents' interests but also those of Indian tribes. A tribe's interest in
its next generation of citizens is adversely affected by the placement of Indian
children in homes with no connection to the tribe, whether or not those children
were initially in the custody of an Indian parent." (citation omitted)).
131. In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168, 175 (Kan. 1982) (articulating
for the first time the "Existing Indian Family" doctrine by arguing that the ICWA
and its legislative history reveals a congressional will to prevent "the removal of
Indian children from their Indian environment" and that the ICWA does not apply
in cases where the Native American child was not a member of a Native American
home or culture (emphasis added)).
132. Id. at 174-76 (denying the Kiowa Tribe's motion to intervene on behalf of
the child to keep the child from being removed from the tribal community by the
trial court).
133. Id. at 172-73, 175 ("[The ICWA} was not to dictate that an illegitimate
infant who has never been a member of an Indian home or culture, and probably
never would be, should be removed from its primary cultural heritage and placed in
an Indian environment over the express objections of its non-Indian mother."
(emphasis added)).
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rejected the "Existing Indian Family" exception since its creation,
including the judiciary that created the doctrine, the Kansas
Supreme Court."
After nearly three decades, the Kansas
Supreme Court acknowledged the "Existing Indian Family"
exception did not comport with the ICWA and its legislative
history's main concern of preserving a Native American child's
heritage with his or her tribe and tribal sovereignty over Native
American child welfare."' The movement toward repudiating and

134. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 100, at 866 n.1 (summarizing state
court decisions rejecting the "Existing Indian Family" exception and state court
decisions adopting the exception). See also In re Adoption of T.N.F., 781 P.2d 973,
977 (Alaska 1989) (finding an application of the "Existing Indian Family" doctrine
exception to mother of Native American child would undermine tribe's interest and
the children as well as contradict the ICWA's plain language); In re Baby Boy Doe,
849 P.2d 925, 931-32 (Idaho 1993) (finding the ICWA applicable to the termination
of parental rights because the Holyfield case has effectively undermined the
imposition of the "Existing Indian Family" doctrine and the doctrine conflicts with
express provisions of the ICWA); In re Adoption of S.S. & R.S., 657 N.E.2d 935, 953
(Ill. 1995) (McMorrow, J., dissenting) ("There is no provision in the ICWA requiring
that an Indian child be born into or be living in an Indian family unit to be subject
to its provisions."); In re Welfare of S.N.R., 617 N.W.2d 77, 81 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000)
(holding that a Band's determination of eligibility is conclusive); In re Adoption of
Riffle, 922 P.2d 510, 513 (Mont. 1996) (finding Native American child's enrollment
not required and Tribe's determination child is a member sufficient); Hoots v. KB.
(In re A.B.), 663 N.W.2d 625, 636 (N.D. 2003) (rejecting the "Existing Indian
Family" exception to termination of parental rights because it is contrary to the
plain language of the ICWA and thwarts the tribe's interest); In re Adoption of a
Child of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d 925, 932 (N.J. 1988) (finding the ICWA applied
to voluntarily relinquished child for adoption regardless of whether the child ever
lived in a Native American environment or with a Native American family); In re
Baby Boy L., 103 P.3d 1099, 1103 (Okla. 2004) (holding the existing Indian family
exception to application of the ICWA for a Native American child proceeding no
longer viable); In re Adoption of Baade, 462 N.W.2d 485, 489-90 (S.D. 1990)
(rejecting prior opinion applying the "Existing Indian Family" doctrine because it
was inconsistent with the ICWA).
135. In re A.J.S., 204 P.3d 543, 546-47 (Kan. 2009) ("The validity of the existing
Indian family doctrine has been called into repeated question by a variety of courts
and commentators over the course of the 27 years since Baby Boy L. was
decided.... [The U.S. Supreme Court in] its 1989 decision in [Holyfield],
underscored the central importance of the relationship between an Indian child and
his or her tribe, independent of any parental relationship.... [Wle hereby overrule
Baby Boy L., and abandon its existing Indian family doctrine.... ICWA's overall
design . .. ensures that all interests-those of both natural parents, the tribe, the
child, and the prospective adoptive parents-are appropriately considered and
safeguarded." (citation omitted)); see Aliza G. Organick, Holding Back the Tide: The
Existing Indian Family Doctrine and Its Continued Denial of the Right to Culture
for Indigenous Children, in FACING THE FUTURE, supra note 1, at 221, 229 ("What
remains so troubling about the ["Existing Indian Family" exception] is that it
allows these courts to define whether a particular child is an Indian. This clearly
takes that determination out of the hands of tribes. In addition, it allows these
courts to decide whether and to what degree a particular parent is Indian enough,
and whether and to what degree an Indian family is Indian enough for ICWA to
apply. This not only runs afoul of congressional intent in enacting this legislation,
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abandoning the "Existing Indian Family" exception suggests that
numerous state courts find the state-created exception to the
ICWA repugnant to the congressional intention of the statute even
though these state courts previously adopted the exception. 36 Even
some state legislatures have found it necessary to overturn the
exception through statutory repeal by restoring the greater
protections embedded within the ICWA and similar state
ICWAs.137
While the Adoptive Couple majority opinion did not adopt
outright the "Existing Indian Family" exception,'"1 the rationale of
the majority opinion reflects a similar thought process as those
state courts who adopted the "Existing Indian Family" exception to
but it also allows for these courts to make decisions that clearly only the tribes
themselves are allowed to make.").
136. Dan Lewerenz & Padraic McCoy, The End of "Existing Indian Family"
Jurisprudence: Holyfield at 20, In the Matter of A.J.S., and the Last Gasps of a
Dying Doctrine, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 684, 723 (2010) (arguing that the
numerous states codifying "the doctrine's rejection, and the substantive repudiation
of the rationales used to support it" indicates that the doctrine's acceptance as a
viable exception to the ICWA is on the decline).
137. CAL. FAM. CODE § 175(c) (West Supp. 2004) ("A determination by an Indian
tribe that an unmarried person, who is under the age of 18 years, is either (1) a
member of an Indian tribe or (2) eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and a
biological child of a member of an Indian tribe shall constitute a significant political
affiliation with the tribe and shall require the application of the federal Indian
Child Welfare Act to the proceedings."); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232B.5(2) (West 2006)
("A state court does not have discretion to determine the applicability of the federal
Indian Child Welfare Act or this chapter to a child custody proceeding based upon
whether an Indian child is part of an existing Indian family."); MINN. STAT. §
260.771(2) (2012) ("A court shall not determine the applicability of this chapter or
the federal Indian Child Welfare Act to a child custody proceeding based upon
whether an Indian child is part of an existing Indian family or based upon the level
of contact a child has with the child's Indian tribe, reservation, society, or offreservation community." (emphasis added)); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 40.3(B)
(West 2009) (applying the Oklahoma Indian Child Welfare Act to all state
voluntary and involuntary child custody proceedings involving Native American
children "regardless of whether or not the children involved are in the physical or
legal custody of an Indian parent or Indian custodian at the time state proceedings
are initiated"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.34.040(3) (West 2013) (predicating the
application of Washington's state Indian Child Welfare Act merely on whether the
child is Native American as defined by the statute and nothing more); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 938.028(3)(a) (2014) ("[The Wisconsin Indian Child Welfare Act] and the
federal Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 USC 1901 to 1963, apply to any Indian
juvenile custody proceeding regardless of whether the Indian juvenile is in the legal
custody or physical custody of an Indian parent, Indian custodian, extended family
member, or other person .. . and whether the Indian juvenile resides or is
domiciled on or off of a reservation.").
138. Ass'N ON AMERICAN INDIAN AFFAIRS & NAT'L INDIAN CHILD WELFARE AsS'N,
A GUIDE TO THE SUPREME COURT DECISION IN ADOPTIVE COUPLE V. BABY GIRL 7
at
available
(2013),
http://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2013/10/analysisofadoptivecouplevbabygirlfinal-l.pdf.
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the ICWA. What the Adoptive Couple majority opinion and state
courts adopting the "Existing Indian Family" exception share is
the belief that where statutory silence is present on a nuanced
jurisdictional or definitional issue, the ICWA is inapplicable, and
the federal statute should not be read in favor of protecting tribal
interests, preserving Native American heritage, or providing
heightened procedural safeguards before depriving Native
American parents of their parental rights. Instead, the Court
endorsed the creation of a federal common law exception to the
federal statute. 39 In creating this federal common law exception,
the Adoptive Couple majority's rationale contradicts the ICWA's
legislative history,' the text of the statute,141 and canons of Indian
law construction. 2 Moreover, the majority opinion accepts a
similar justification like that found in the repudiated legal
analysis of the "Existing Indian Family" exception: a statecreated, common law doctrine that is on the decline in popularity
among state courts and state legislatures on the basis that such a
justification is incongruent with congressional intent behind
enacting the ICWA.
IV. Adoptive Couple's Evisceration of the ICWA's
Protections of Absentee Native American Parents
Creates a Legal Vacuum to be Filled by Adverse State
Laws

The Adoptive Couple majority opinion creates a statutory
vacuum for determinations on whether a Native American
possesses the parental rights requisite to invoke the ICWA,
139. The Adoptive Couple decision is an example of creating federal common law.
The ICWA did not mandate on its face the inapplicability of the statute's
heightened protections to absentee Native American parents. From the Court's
perspective, it needed to fill in the gaps of the federal statute by engaging in a
stilted dictionary approach to a statutory construction of the ICWA. This resulted
in the creation of a federal rule of decision in the field of federal Indian law
pertaining to absentee Native American parents and their parental rights under
the ICWA. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal
Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1985) ("'Federal common law' ... means any federal
rule of decision that is not mandated on the face of some authoritative federal
text-whether or not that rule can be described as the product of 'interpretation' in
either a conventional or unconventional sense."); Marta A. Field, Sources of Law:
The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARv. L. REV. 881, 890 (1986) ("[Flederal
common law' refer[s] to any rule of federal law created by a court ... when the
substance of that rule is not clearly suggested by federal enactmentsconstitutional or congressional.").
140. See supra Part III(A).
141. See supra Part III(A).
142. See supra Part III(B).
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allowing her or him to object to a child custody or adoption
proceeding. Thus, state family law, which is inherently adverse to
absentee parents and is insensitive to the federal creation of a
unique enclave of protection for Native American parent-childtribal relationships, will fill that legal vacuum to the detriment of
Native American parents.'4 1 Moreover, the application of state
family law will be a contradiction of the ICWA's congressional
intent to provide a uniform federal standard in terminating Native
Without the application of the
American parental rights. 44
ICWA's procedural protections for parental rights, the default law
to govern will be state laws. Some states provide only the
minimum protection for parental rights. For example, in some
states, consent for an adoption is forfeited if the parent fails to
financially support the child and fails to be physically present in
However, other states provide greater
the child's life. 145
protections before parental rights are terminated.146
Given the high stakes in preserving tribal heritage, the
parent-child relationship should not hinge on residence in a state
which provides robust protections for parental rights. The ICWA

143. See B. J. Jones, The Indian Child Welfare Act: In Search of a FederalForum
to Vindicate the Rights of Indian Tribes and ChildrenAgainst the Vagaries of State
Courts, 73 N.D. L. REV. 395, 396 n.7 (1997) (explaining that Congress enacted the
ICWA as "remedial legislation" to address the "inherent weaknesses of state courts
to adjudicate child custody proceedings involving Indian children").
144. See Id. at 421 (describing the U.S. Supreme Court's implication in Holyfield
that Congress intended to provide uniformity in the application of the ICWA).
145. See, e.g., Roe v. Reeves, 708 S.E.2d 778, 785 (S.C. 2011) (holding that a
father's one-time offer to contribute $100 for the mother's support during the
pregnancy was not a sufficient effort to "make the sacrifices fatherhood demands,"
and therefore, "not sufficient compliance with the [state] statute to establish his
right to consent to the adoption of [his] minor child"); In re Adoption of G.L.V., 163
P.3d 334, 340 (Kan. App. 2007) (finding that an adoption without a biological
parent's consent is only permissible if the biological parent failed to fulfill the
parental duties of financially supporting the child and failed to communicate and
visit the child according to state law); In re B.S.R., 965 S.W.2d 444, 449 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1998) (finding that "willful neglect," [failure to contribute to a child's financial
support and lack of contact enough to establish willful neglect], alone is sufficient
to allow an adoption of a child without the consent of the biological parent(s)
according to state law).
146. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§8-106(G) to (J) (2007) (requiring notice of
an adoption petition be given to all "potential father[s]" and that they be informed
of their "right to seek custody"); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.33.020(1), 26.33.160(1)(b)
(2012) (requiring that "alleged father's]" consent to adoption is required absent the
termination of his parental rights); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.120(2) (permitting
the termination of parental rights only "upon a showing by clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence" not only that termination is in the best interest of the child
and that the father is withholding his consent to adoption contrary to the child's
best interest, but also that the father "has failed to perform parental duties under
circumstances showing a substantial lack of regard for his parental obligations").
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was passed to provide a uniform, minimum federal standard for a
Native American child's rights in relation to the tribe. Protection
of Native American parental rights is just one method to that
end.1 7
Allowing various state laws to be dispositive in the
termination of parental rights ignores the ICWA's general rule
that the best interest of the Native American child is to remain
with his or her tribe.14 Application of various state standards
without regard to the ICWA standards creates inequality for
Native American children residing in states with less robust
protections for parental rights.
V. A Legislative Remedy: Congressional Amendment of the
ICWA Explicitly Permitting the Exclusive Use of Tribal
Law in Determinations of Termination of Parental
Rights
Some Native American children live in states with weak
protection of parental rights. They have unequal rights compared
to Native American children living in states with stronger
protection of parental rights because the likelihood of not
remaining a part of their tribe is higher. These Native American
children are more vulnerable to removal from their Native
American heritage and culture, especially if the child's parent is
an absentee parent. One solution to this protective inequality is
for Congress to amend the ICWA to directly repudiate Adoptive
Couple's "continued custody" exception to the application of the
statute in protecting the parental rights of absentee Native
American parents.
However, since Congress has not passed
several proposed federal bills which would repudiate the "Existing
Indian Family" exception, it is unlikely that Congress will be able
to enact legislation directly addressing the newly created
"continued custody" exception."' An alternative solution is for
147. Lorinda Mall, Keeping It in the Family: The Legal and Social Evolution of
ICWA in State and Tribal Jurisprudence,in FACING THE FUTuRE, supra note 1, at
164, 186; see COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 100, at 861 ("These narrow state
interpretations [like the "Existing Indian Family" exception, and now the U.S.
Supreme Court's "continued custody" interpretation,] disregard the fact that the
Indian child, not the nonmarital father, is the trigger for ICWA's application.
Moreover, the child's and the tribe's rights are independent of the parent's or
Indian custodian's. They continue to exist despite the father's disqualification as a
parent or his objection to applying the ICWA.").
148. Mall, supra note 147, at 186 (arguing that the ICWA "does not provide for
many of these [state] standards.").
149. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 100, at 868; see generally Jones, supra note
143, at 422 (arguing that a lack of congressional intervention and repudiation of
state-created common law exceptions to the application of the ICWA is because
Congress does not directly fund implementation of the statute, and therefore, states
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Congress to amend the ICWA to allow tribal law to govern
This solution would
adoption or foster care proceedings.
strengthen tribal self-governance by granting tribes authority to
determine if a Native American parent's parental rights have been
terminated, and allows the tribe to decide whether that parent's
absence or abandonment of the child are relevant. Alternatively, if
the U.S. Congress lacks the political will to act, state legislatures
are free to pass or amend state ICWAs to allow for tribal law to
control in termination of parental rights proceedings.
Generally speaking, tribal laws provide greater protections
for parental rights.5 o In In re J.J.S., a case involving maternal
neglect of a Native American child, the Navajo Supreme Court
stressed that "[a]doption is merely a case of taking the children
into the home for a limited time, or permanently, by extending
family or parental agreement.""' The Navajo Supreme Court's
decision is based on a communal approach with an emphasis on
the child's relationship to tribal members with the expectation of
shared responsibility in nurturing the child.152 Moreover, Navajo
common law "deemphasizes the termination of parental rights,"
which makes Navajo adoption an "informal [proceeding] . . . based

upon community expectations.""' This view of adoption provides
an opportunity for biological parents to retain a connection with
their children, and their children retain a connection with their
parents through the tribal community. It also allows for more
robust tribal sovereignty over child welfare than the holding in
Adoptive Couple.

Conclusion
The Adoptive Couple majority went against the legislative
history and the text of the ICWA in its holding. 5" The Court
ignored the canons of Indian law construction, which would have
required a more generous and liberal reading of the ICWA in favor
of Dusten Brown's termination of parental rights, receiving the
rigorous procedural due process protections provided for in the
ICWA, which are often greater protections than those provided in

cannot be easily nudged into compliance with the statute by Congress exerting
leverage against the states with its power over the purse).
150. An exhaustive analysis of Native American parental rights under tribal
laws is beyond the scope of this Comment.
151. In re J.J.S., 4 Nay. R. 192 (1983).
152. Mall, supra note 147, at 193.
153. Id.
154. See supra Part III(A).
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most state courts applying state family law."' In spite of the
eroding rationale that once justified the "Existing Indian Family"
exception to the ICWA, the Court created a twin exception through
federal common law.'16 The only feasible solution that will
strengthen tribal self-determination and sovereignty over Native
American child welfare is for either Congress to amend the ICWA
to allow the use of tribal law or states to amend their state ICWAs
to allow tribal law to control in termination proceedings of
parental rights.

155. See supra Parts 111(B) and IV.
156. See supra Part III(C).

